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RECENT DECISIONS
Conklin: Cottingham v. State Board of Examiners

MONTANA CONSTITUTION -

STATE DEBT LIMIT -

SUBMISSION TO THE

PEoPiE-In the 1950 general election the Montana electorate adopted Initiative Measure Number 54' which created an honorarium for Montana
veterans of World War II from funds to be raised by a twenty-two million dollar bond issue, redeemed by a cigarette tax. The Montana Legislative Assembly in 1957 enacted a law which amended this initiative by
providing for payment of an honorarium to Montana Korean War veterans
on the same basis,' and by authorizing a bond issue of six million dollars
to be redeemed by an additional cigarette tax. No provision was made for
submitting the amendment to the electorate. An action to determine the
constitutionality of the bill was brought by a citizen against the State
Board of Examiners on the ground, among others, that it violated Article
XIII, Section 2, of the Montana Constitution in creating a debt or liability in excess of $100,000 without having been submitted to the people
at a general election.' On appeal to the Montana Supreme Court from
a judgment sustaining the bill, held, affirmed. Only those debts or liabilities which look to ad valorem taxes for their retirement must first be
presented to the people, and not those secured by excises or licenses.
Cottingham v. State Board of Examiners, 328 P.2d 907 (Mont. 1958)
(Justice Adair dissenting).
That an initiative or referendum may be amended by the legislature
seems to be a well established rule in Montana.' But such an amendment
must still conform to constitutional limitations on legislative powers The
question in the instant case is whether the Korean bonus amendment is
within such constitutional limits.
In interpreting similar constitutional debt limitations the courts of
other states generally use what could be called the "special fund doctrine."
Although not recognized by all courts which follow the doctrine, a special
fund generally has two important facets. The debt created must be secured
solely by a special fund and not by the general faith aind credit of the
state, i.e., the bonds must specify that they are to be retired only by the
special fund involved. Futhermore, the special fund itself must be created
by the imposition of fees, penalties, or excise taxes as distinguished from
ad valorem or property taxes.8
This doctrine, however, was rejected by the Montana Supreme Court
in the following specific language in State ex rel. Diederich v. State Highway Commission:' "The fact that a special fund is created by the imposition of the license or excise tax on motor fuels with which to pay the
'Laws of Montana 1951, at 781.
'Laws of Montana 1957, c. 44.
"MONT. CONST. art. XIII, § 2 provides in part: "The legislative assembly shall
not In any manner create any debt ... which shall singly, or in the aggregate with
any existing debt or liability, exceed the sum of one hundred thousand dollars
($100,000) . . .unless the law authorizing the same shall have been submitted to
the people at a general election and shall have received a majority of the votes
cast for and against it at such election."
'See Bottomly v. Ford, 117 Mont. 160, 157 P.2d 108 (1945).
5
8State ex rel. Goodman v. Stewart, 57 Mont. 144, 187 Pac. 641 (1920).
6Annot., 100 A.L.R. 900 (1936).
This annotation Indicates that some courts look
only to the existence of a special fund, while others look to the character of the
impost levied as well.
'89 Mont. 205, 296 Pac. 103 (1931).
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debentures is of no importance." The principal argument in the case was
that the bill in question did not create a debt, but the court held that it
did create a liability, which was sufficient to bring the bill within the
debt limitation of the Montana Constitution.
Shortly after the Diederichs decision Article IX, Section 2, of the
Montana Constitution was amended to provide that the names of those
voting on any levy, debt, or liability, must appear on the last tax roll
of the state.8 While there has been no change in Article XIII, Section 2,
the court in the instant decision construed the two sections together and,
relying heavily upon a New Mexico decision,' concluded that since only
property taxpayers are qualified to vote on such a debt limit question,
debts secured by the levy of other than property or ad valorem taxes need
not be submitted to them." The court said that the amendment of Article
IX, Section 2, effected an amendment of Article XIII, Section 2, impliedly
changing the phrase "debt or liability" to "debt or liability looking to
ad valorem taxes for their retirement. ' Therefore since the bond issue
in question involved only a cigarette excise tax it did not require submission to the voters.
Under the rationale of the present case the original twenty-two million dollar bond issue need not have been submitted to the people. Indeed,
the power of the Montana Legislature to create any debt, no matter how
large, is now virtually unlimited so long as that debt is secured by an
excise tax.
The dissenting opinion insists that the Diederichs case is controlling,
and asserts that if revenue from excise sources is diverted from the
general fund in this manner, the entire burden of the state's general expenses will eventually fall on the property taxpayer. Consequently, he has
a substantial interest as a property taxpayer even in debts secured by
excise taxation.
At least one court has taken the position that a debt limit clause is
inserted in a constitution simply to establish a maximum indebtedness that
might at any time be created -by the legislature alone." In spite of the
fact that special fund bonds may not look to the state general fund for
retirement, the State has a strong moral obligation to back these bonds.
If a state were in poor financial condition it might not be altogether desirable to remove this obstacle to increasing state indebtedness. On the
other hand, the aggregate debt limitation of $100,000, established at
statehood may well be insufficient in light of today's costs, and not at
8

MoNT. CoNST. art. IX, § 2, reads today in part as follows: "If the question submitted concerns the creation of any levy, debt, or liability the person, in addition to
possessing the qualifications above mentioned, must also be a taxpayer whose name
appears upon the last preceding completed assessment roll, in order to entitle him
to vote upon such question."
9
State e rel. Capitol Addition Bldg. Comm'n. v. Connelly, 39 N.M. 312, 46 P.2d 1097,
100 A.L.R. 878 (1935).
'Substantially the same reasoning was applied in the New Mexico case, note 9

supra, based on the fact that the debt limit was calculated at a percentage of the
assessed property valuation of the entire state for the year preceding. Therefore,
the court reasoned, the debt limit was applicable only to instances where a property
tax was levied to secure the debt.
'Instant case at 916.
"Bickerdike v. State, 144 Cal. 681, 78 Pac. 270 (1904) (dictum).
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all consistent with the needs of a growing and developing state. But this
situation could be remedied by amending the Constitution to increase the
debt limitation rather than by restricting the safeguards to the people established in the constitutional provisions. Such an amendment would have
the virtue of retaining control of major indebtedness in the people while
still allowing legislative action in more routine expenditures.
1958]

While the desirability of a liberal interpretation of the Montana
Constitution is a matter open to debate, the desirability of a consistent
interpretation is not. That the Montana Supreme Court has not always
been consistent in its interpretive approach is illustrated by a comparision of the instant decision with the case of Morgan v. Murray," decided
seven days later. The bill there in question " also involved Article XIII,
Section 2. It authorized an education bond issue of ten million dollars,
provided for the levy of a property tax, and for referral to the people at
the next general election. Two questions were presented by the case:
first, whether the bill was a revenue measure; and if so, whether it was
unconstitutional since it originated in the Senate instead of the House.
The argument in favor of the bill was that the particular provision relating to originating revenue measures in the House was intended to place
the responsibility for such measures in that branch of the legislature most
directly responsible to the people. The State further urged that since
the bill was to be submitted directly to the electorate there was no danger
of circumventing the spirit of the Constitution. The Court found the bill
to be a revenue measure and, applying a strict construction, held it unconstitutional because it did not originate in the House of Representatives.
This narrow construction stands in sharp contrast to the liberal constitutional interpretation applied one week earlier in the decision of the instant case.
Of course, there may well be distinctions between the two cases which
would tend to explain their divergent results. But there can be no justification on the basis of the substantive rights involved. On the contrary, the
opposite result in the Morgan decision involving the education bond issue
would have had little effect upon the substantive rights of the people.
However, the holding in the Cottingham case could have a substantial ef-'
feet upon such rights by allowing inordinate bond issues secured by excise
taxation, without any direct control by the people.
The Cottingham decision has set the debt limitation question at rest
in Montana by confining it to bond issues involving property taxes. In
view of Montana's current need for increased revehue, the principal ease
could have far-reaching effects upon the activities of the 1959 legislative
assembly.
The significant question left unanswered by these two decisions is
whether the Court will adopt a liberal or strict approach to problems of
constitutional construction.
WILLIAM CONKLIN

1"328 P.2d 644 (Mont. 1958).
"Laws of Montana 1957, e. 197.
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